Entropic Dynamics: Mechanics without Mechanism by Caticha, Ariel
ar
X
iv
:1
70
4.
02
66
3v
2 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
21
 Fe
b 2
01
8
Entropic Dynamics: Mechanics without
Mechanism
Ariel Caticha
Physics Department, University at Albany-SUNY, Albany, NY 12222, USA.
Abstract
Entropic Dynamics is a framework in which dynamical laws such as
those that arise in physics are derived as an application of entropic meth-
ods of inference. No underlying action principle is postulated. Instead,
the dynamics is driven by entropy subject to constraints reflecting the
information that is relevant to the problem at hand. In this chapter I re-
view the derivation of of three forms of mechanics. The first is a standard
diffusion, the second is a form of Hamiltonian mechanics, and finally, an
argument from information geometry is used to motivate the particular
choice of Hamiltonian that leads to quantum mechanics.
Law without Law: “The only thing harder to understand than a law of sta-
tistical origin would be a law that is not of statistical origin, for then there
would be no way for it — or its progenitor principles — to come into
being.”
Two tests: “No test of these views looks like being someday doable, nor more
interesting and more instructive, than a derivation of the structure of
quantum theory... No prediction lends itself to a more critical test than
this, that every law of physics, pushed to the extreme, will be found statis-
tical and approximate, not mathematically perfect and precise.”
J. A. Wheeler [1]
1 Introduction
The drive to explain nature has always led us to seek the mechanisms hidden
behind the phenomena. Descartes, for example, claimed to explain the motion
of planets as being swept along in the flow of some vortices. The model did not
work very well but at least it gave the illusion of a mechanical explanation and
thereby satisfied a deep psychological need. Newton’s theory fared much better.
He took the important step of postulating that gravity was a universal force
acting at a distance but he abstained from offering any mechanical explanation
— a stroke of genius immortalized in his famous “hypotheses non fingo.” At first
there were objections. Huygens, for instance, recognized the undeniable value
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of Newton’s achievement but was nevertheless deeply disappointed: the theory
works but it does not explain. And Newton agreed: any action at a distance
would represent “so great an absurdity... that no man who has in philosophical
matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it.” [2]
Over the following 18th century, however, impressed by the many successes
of Newtonian mechanics, people started to downplay and then even forget their
qualms about the absurdity of action at a distance. Mechanical explanations
were, of course, still required but the very meaning of what counted as “mechan-
ical” suffered a gradual but irreversible shift. It no longer meant “caused by
contact forces” but rather “described according to Newton’s laws.” Over time
Newtonian forces, including those mysterious actions at a distance, became
“real” which qualified them to count as the causes behind phenomena.
But this did not last too long. With Lagrange, Hamilton, and Maxwell, the
notion of force started to lose some of its fundamental status. Indeed, after
Maxwell succeeded in extending the principles of dynamics to include the elec-
tromagnetic field, the meaning of ‘mechanical explanation’ changed once again.
It no longer meant identifying the Newtonian forces, but rather identifying the
right Lagrangian, the right action principle. Thus, today gravity is no longer
explained through a force but through the curvature of space-time. And the
concept of force finds no place in quantum mechanics where interactions are
described as the evolution of abstract vectors in Hilbert space.
Our goal in this chapter is to derive useful dynamical models without in-
voking underlying mechanisms. This does not mean that such mechanisms do
not exist, for all we know they might. It is just that useful models can be con-
structed without having to go through the trouble of keeping track of a myriad
of microscopic details that often turn out to be ultimately irrelevant. The idea
can be illustrated by contrasting the two very different ways in which the theory
of Brownian motion was originally derived by Smoluchowski and by Einstein. In
Smoluchowski’s approach one keeps track of the microscopic details of molecular
collisions through a stochastic Langevin equation and a macroscopic effective
theory is then derived by taking suitable averages. In Einstein’s approach, on
the other hand, one focuses directly on those pieces of information that turn
out to be relevant for the prediction of macroscopic effects. The advantage of
Einstein’s approach is the simplicity that arises from not having to keep track
of irrelevant details that are eventually washed out when taking the averages.
The challenge, of course, is to identify those pieces of information that happen
to be relevant.
Our argument proceeds by stages. We will exhibit three explicit examples.
Starting with the simplest, we first tackle a standard diffusion, which allows
us to introduce and discuss the non-trivial concept of time. In the next stage
we discuss the derivation of Hamiltonian dynamics as a non-dissipative type
of diffusion. Finally, in a further elaboration invoking notions of information
geometry, we identify the particular Hamiltonian that leads to quantum me-
chanics.
Ever since its origin in 1925 the interpretation of quantum mechanics has
been a notoriously controversial subject. The central question revolves around
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the interpretation of the quantum state, the wave function: does it represent
the actual real state of the system (its ontic state) or does it represent a state
of knowledge about the system (an epistemic state)? Excellent reviews with ex-
tended references to the literature are given in [3]-[6]. However, the urge to seek
underlying mechanisms has motivated a huge effort towards identifying hidden
variables and sub-quantum levels of reality from which an effective quantum
dynamics might emerge. (See e.g., [7]-[13].) In this work we adopt the point
of view that quantum theory itself provides us with the most important clue:
the goal of quantum mechanics is to calculate probabilities. Therefore, by its
very nature, quantum mechanics must be an instance of Bayesian and entropic
inference.
Entropic Dynamics (ED) provides a framework for deriving dynamical laws
as an application of entropic methods [14]-[17]. The use of entropy as a tool for
inference can be traced to E. T. Jaynes [18]-[20]. For a pedagogical overview
and further references see [21].
The literature on the attempts to reconstruct quantum mechanics is vast
and there are several approaches that like ED are also based on information
theory (see e.g., [22]-[31]). Since all these approaches must sooner or later
converge to the same Schro¨dinger equation it is inevitable that they will show
similarities but there are, however, important differences. What distinguishes
ED is a strict adherence to Bayesian and entropic methods without invoking
mechanisms operating at some deeper sub-quantum level.
This chapter is basically a self-contained review of material developed in [14]-
[17] but with one significant change. The gist of Entropic Dynamics is that the
system of interest (e.g., particles or fields) undergoes a diffusion with a special
systematic drift which is ultimately responsible for such quintessential quantum
phenomena as interference and entanglement. A central idea introduced in [14],
but not fully developed in later publications, is that this peculiar drift is itself
of entropic origin. More precisely, the drift follows the gradient of the entropy
of some extra variables which remain hidden or at least inaccessible. Here
we intend to pursue this fully entropic interpretation of the drift while taking
advantage of later insights that exploit ideas from information geometry.
An important feature of ED is a central concern with the nature of time.
In ED “entropic” time is designed to keep track of change. The construction
of entropic time involves several ingredients. One must define the notion of
‘instants’; show that these instants happen to be ordered; and finally one must
define a convenient measure of the duration or interval between the successive
instants. As one might have expected, in an entropic approach to time it turns
out that an arrow of time is generated automatically. Entropic time is intrinsi-
cally directional.
Here we will focus on the derivation of the Schro¨dinger equation but the ED
approach has been applied to a variety of other topics in quantummechanics that
will not be reviewed here. These include the quantum measurement problem
[32][33]; momentum and uncertainty relations [34]; the Bohmian limit [35][36]
and the classical limit [37]; the extensions to curved spaces [38] and to relativistic
fields [39][40]; and the derivation of symplectic and complex structures from
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information geometry [41].
2 The statistical model
As in any inference problem we must first decide on the subject matter — what
are we talking about? We consider N particles living in a flat Euclidean space
X with metric δab. Here is our first assumption: The particles have definite
positions xan, collectively denoted by x, and it is their unknown values that we
wish to infer. (The index n = 1 . . .N labels the particles and a = 1, 2, 3 its
spatial coordinates.) For N particles the configuration space is XN = X× . . .×
X. The fact that positions are unknown implies that the probability distribution
ρ(x) will be the focus of our attention.
Incidentally, this already addresses that old question of determinism vs. in-
determinism that has troubled quantum mechanics from the outset. In the
standard view quantum theory is considered to be an extension of classical
mechanics and therefore deviations from causality demand an explanation. In
contrast, according to the entropic view, quantum mechanics is an example
of entropic inference, a framework designed to handle insufficient information.
From this entropic perspective indeterminism requires no explanation; uncer-
tainty and probabilities are the expected norm. It is certainty and determinism
that demand explanations [37].
The assumption that the particles have definite positions that happen to
be unknown is a not an innocent statement. It represents a major shift away
from the standard Copenhagen interpretation. Such a departure is not in itself a
problem: our goal here is not to justify any particular interpretation of quantum
mechanics but to reproduce its empirical success. According to the Copenhagen
interpretation observable quantities such as positions, do not in general have
definite values; they can become definite but only as the immediate result of
a measurement. ED differs in that positions play a very special role: at all
times particles have definite positions which define the ontic state of the system.
The wave function, on the other hand, is a purely epistemic notion; it defines
our epistemic state about the system. In ED — just as in the Copenhagen
interpretation — other observables such as energy or momentum do not in
general have definite values; their values are created by the act of measurement.
These other quantities are epistemic in that they do not reflect properties of
the particles but of the wave function. Thus positions are ontic while energies
and momenta are epistemic. This point deserves to be emphasized: in the ED
description of the double slit experiment, we might not know which slit the
particle goes through, but it definitely goes through one or the other.
The second assumption is that in addition to the particles there also exist
some other variables denoted y. The assumption does not appear extreme.1
First, the world definitely contains more stuff than the N particles we happen
1As we shall later discuss in more detail in the concluding remarks, the y variables, al-
though hidden from our view, do not at all play the technical role usually ascribed to “hidden
variables”.
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to be currently interested in and, second, it turns out that our main conclusions
are very robust in that they turn out to be largely independent of most particular
details about these y variables. We only need to assume that the y variables are
themselves uncertain and that their uncertainty, described by some probability
distribution p(y|x), depends on the location x of the particles. As we shall soon
see it is the entropy of the distribution p(y|x) that plays a significant role in
defining the dynamics of x. Other details of the distribution p(y|x) turn out
to be irrelevant. For later reference, the entropy S(x) of p(y|x) relative to an
underlying measure q(y) on the space of y variables is
S(x) = −
∫
dy p(y|x) log
p(y|x)
q(y)
. (1)
For notational simplicity in multidimensional integrals such as (1) we will write
dy instead of dny. Note also that S(x) is a scalar function on the configuration
space XN .
Once the microstates (x, y) ∈ XN×Y are identified we proceed to tackle the
dynamics. Our goal is to find the probability density P (x′|x) for a change from
an initial position x ∈ XN to a new neighboring x
′ ∈ XN . Since both x
′ and
the associated y′ are unknown the relevant space is not just XN but XN ×Y
and, therefore, the distribution we seek is the joint distribution P (x′, y′|x, y).
This is found by maximizing the appropriate entropy,
S[P,Q] = −
∫
dx′dy′ P (x′, y′|x, y) log
P (x′, y′|x, y)
Q(x′, y′|x, y)
, (2)
relative to the joint prior Q(x′, y′|x, y) and subject to the appropriate con-
straints.
Choosing the prior
In eq.(2) the prior Q(x′, y′|x, y) expresses our beliefs — or more precisely, the
beliefs of an ideally rational agent — before any information about the specific
motion is taken into account. We adopt a prior that represents a state of
considerable ignorance: knowledge of xs tells us nothing about ys and vice
versa. This is represented by a product,
Q(x′, y′|x, y) = Q(x′|x)Q(y′|y) . (3)
The priorQ(y′|y) for the y variables is chosen to be a uniform distribution. If the
volume element in the space Y is proportional to q(y)dy then Q(y′|y) ∝ q(y′).
The measure q(y) need not be specified further. The prior Q(x′|x) for the x
variables is considerably more informative.
In a “mechanics without a mechanism” one does not explain why motion
happens. The goal instead is to produce an estimate of what kind of motion
one might reasonably expect. The central piece of dynamical information is
that the particles follow trajectories that are continuous. This represents yet
another significant deviation from the early historical development of quantum
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mechanics which stressed discreteness and discontinuity. Fortunately, in mod-
ern versions of quantum mechanics these two aspects are de-emphasized. Ever
since Schro¨dinger’s pioneering work the discreteness of quantum numbers is not
mysterious — certainly not more mysterious than the discrete resonances of
classical vibrations. And the discontinuities implicit in abrupt quantum jumps,
a relic from Bohr’s old quantum theory, just do not exist; they were eventually
recognized as unnecessary and effectively discarded as soon as Schro¨dinger for-
mulated his equation. Incidentally, there is another source of discontinuity —
the so-called wave function collapse. Its mystery disappears the moment one
recognizes the epistemic nature of the wave function: the collapse is not physical
but merely an instance of probability updating [32][33].
The assumption of continuity represents a tremendous simplification because
it implies that motion can be analyzed as the accumulation of many infinitesi-
mally short steps. We adopt a prior Q(x′|x) that incorporates the information
that the particles take steps that are infinitesimally short, that reflects transla-
tional and rotational invariance, but is otherwise maximally ignorant about any
correlations. Such a prior can itself be derived from the principle of maximum
entropy. Indeed, maximize
S[Q] = −
∫
dx′Q(∆x) log
Q(∆x)
µ
, (4)
where ∆xan = x
′a
n − x
a
n, relative to the uniform measure µ =const., subject
to normalization, and N independent constraints that enforce short steps and
rotational invariance,
〈δab∆x
a
n∆x
b
n〉 = κn , (n = 1 . . .N) , (5)
where κn are small constants. The result is a product of Gaussians,
Q(x′|x) ∝ exp−
1
2
∑
n
αnδab∆x
a
n∆x
b
n . (6)
The Lagrange multipliers αn are constants that may depend on the index n
in order to describe non-identical particles. They will eventually be taken to
infinity in order to enforce infinitesimally short steps.
The choice of a Gaussian prior turns out to be natural, not just because it
arises in an informational context, but also because, as described by the central
limit theorem as in the theory of errors, it arises whenever a “macroscopic”
effect is the result of the accumulation of a large number of “microscopic” con-
tributions.
Since proportionality constants have no effect on the entropy maximization,
our choice for the joint prior is
Q(x′, y′|x, y) = q(y′) exp−
1
2
∑
n
αnδab∆x
a
n∆x
b
n . (7)
Now we are ready to specify the constraints.
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The constraints
We first write the posterior as a product,
P (x′, y′|x, y) = P (x′|x, y)P (y′|x′, x, y) , (8)
and we specify the two factors separately. We require that the new x′ depends
only on x, so we set P (x′|x, y) = P (x′|x) which is the transition probability we
wish to find. The new x′ is independent of the actual values of y or y′ but, as
we shall soon see, it does depend on their entropies.
As for the second factor in (8), we require that P (y′|x′, x, y) = p(y′|x′) —
the uncertainty in y′ depends only on x′. Therefore, the first constraint is that
the joint posterior be of the form
P (x′, y′|x) = P (x′|x)p(y′|x′) . (9)
To implement this constraint substitute (9) into the joint entropy (2) to get
S[P,Q] = −
∫
dx′ P (x′|x) log
P (x′|x)
Q(x′|x)
+
∫
dx′ P (x′|x)S(x′) , (10)
where S(x) is given in eq.(1).
Having specified the prior and the constraints the ME method takes over.
We vary P (x′|x) to maximize (10) subject to normalization. The result is
P (x′|x) =
1
ζ
exp
[
S(x′)−
1
2
∑
n
αnδab∆x
a
n∆x
b
n
]
, (11)
where ζ is a normalization constant. In eq.(11) it is clear that infinitesimally
short steps are obtained in the limit αn → ∞. It is therefore useful to Taylor
expand,
S(x′) = S(x) +
∑
n
∆xan
∂S
∂xan
+ . . . (12)
and rewrite P (x′|x) as
P (x′|x) =
1
Z
exp
[
−
1
2
∑
n
αn δab (∆x
a
n − 〈∆x
a
n〉)
(
∆xbn − 〈∆x
b
n〉
)]
, (13)
where Z is the new normalization constant. A generic displacement ∆xan =
x′an − x
a
n can be expressed as an expected drift plus a fluctuation,
∆xan = 〈∆x
a
n〉+∆w
a
n , where 〈∆x
a
n〉 =
1
αn
δab
∂S
∂xbn
, (14)
〈∆wan〉 = 0 and 〈∆w
a
n∆w
b
n〉 =
1
αn
δab . (15)
These equations show that as αn → ∞, for very short steps, the dynamics is
dominated by fluctuations ∆wan which are of order O(α
−1/2
n ), while the drift
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〈∆xan〉 is much smaller, only of order O(α
−1
n ). Thus, just as in Brownian mo-
tion, the trajectory is continuous but not differentiable. In ED particles have
definite positions but their velocities are completely undefined. Notice also that
the particle fluctuations are isotropic and independent of each other. The di-
rectionality of the motion and correlations among the particles are introduced
by a systematic drift along the gradient of the entropy of the y variables.
The introduction of the auxiliary y variables, which has played a central role
of conveying relevant information about the drift, deserves a comment. It is
important to realize that the same information can be conveyed through other
means, which demonstrates that quantum mechanics, as an effective theory,
turns out to be fairly robust2 [35][36]. It is possible, for example, to avoid the
y variables altogether and invoke a drift potential directly (see e.g., [15]-[17]).
The advantage of an explicit reference to some vaguely defined y variables is
their mere existence may be sufficient to account for drift effects.
3 Entropic time
Having obtained a prediction, given by eq.(13), for what motion to expect in
one infinitesimally short step we now consider motion over finite distances. This
requires the introduction of a parameter t, to be called time, as a book-keeping
tool to keep track of the accumulation of successive short steps. Since the rules of
inference are silent on the subject of time we need to justify why the parameter
t deserves to be called time.
The construction of time involves three ingredients. First, we must identify
something that one might call an “instant”; second, it must be shown that these
instants are ordered; and finally, one must introduce a measure of separation
between these successive instants — one must define “duration.” Since the foun-
dation for any theory of time is the theory of change — that is, dynamics — the
notion of time constructed below will reflect the inferential nature of entropic
dynamics. Such a construction we will call entropic time.
3.1 Time as an ordered sequence of instants
Entropic dynamics is given by a succession of short steps described by P (x′|x),
eq.(13). Consider, for example, the ith step which takes the system from x =
xi−1 to x
′ = xi. Integrating the joint probability, P (xi, xi−1), over xi−1 gives
P (xi) =
∫
dxi−1P (xi, xi−1) =
∫
dxi−1P (xi|xi−1)P (xi−1) . (16)
This equation follows directly from the laws of probability, it involves no as-
sumptions and, therefore, it is sort of empty. To make it useful something else
2In the case of physics, the y variables might for example describe the microscopic structure
of spacetime. In the case of an economy, they may describe the hidden neural processes of
various agents. It is a strength of the ED formulation that details about these auxilliary
variables are not needed.
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must be added. Suppose we interpret P (xi−1) as the probability of different
values of xi−1 at one “instant” labelled t, then we can interpret P (xi) as the
probability of values of xi at the next “instant” which we will label t
′. Writing
P (xi−1) = ρ(x, t) and P (xi) = ρ(x
′, t′) we have
ρ(x′, t′) =
∫
dxP (x′|x)ρ(x, t) . (17)
Nothing in the laws of probability leading to eq.(16) forces the interpretation
(17) on us — this is the additional ingredient that allows us to construct time
and dynamics in our model. Equation (17) defines the notion of “instant”: If
the distribution ρ(x, t) refers to one instant t, then the distribution ρ(x′, t′) gen-
erated by P (x′|x) defines what we mean by the “next” instant t′. Iterating this
process defines the dynamics. Entropic time is constructed instant by instant:
ρ(t′) is constructed from ρ(t), ρ(t′′) is constructed from ρ(t′), and so on.
The construction is intimately related to information and inference. An
‘instant’ is an informational state that is complete in the sense that it is specified
by the information — codified into the distributions ρ(x, t) and P (x′|x) — that
is sufficient for predicting the next instant. To put it briefly: the instant we call
the present is such that the future, given the present, is independent of the past.
In the ED framework the notions of instant and of simultaneity are intimately
related to the distribution ρ(x). It is instructive to discuss this further. When we
consider a single particle at a position ~x = (x1, x2, x3) in 3-d space it is implicit
in the notation that the three coordinates x1, x2, and x3 occur simultaneously
— no surprises here. Things get a bit more interesting when we describe a
system of N particles by a single point x = (~x1, ~x2, . . . ~xN ) in 3N -dimensional
configuration space. Here it is also implicitly assumed that all the 3N coordinate
values refer to the same instant; we take them to be simultaneous. But this is
no longer so trivial because the particles are located at different places — we
do not mean particle 1 is at ~x1 now, and particle 2 is at ~x2 later. There is
an implicit assumption linking the very idea of a configuration space with that
of simultaneity and something similar occurs when we introduce probabilities.
Whether we talk about one particle or about N particles, a distribution such as
ρ(x) describes our uncertainty about the possible configurations x of the system
at a given instant. The different values of x refer to the same instant; they are
meant to be simultaneous. And therefore, in ED, a probability distribution ρ(x)
provides a criterion of simultaneity.
In a relativistic theory there is a greater freedom in the choice of instants
and this translates into a greater flexibility with the notion of simultaneity.
Conversely, as we have shown elsewhere, the requirement that these different
notions of simultaneity be consistent with each other places strict constraints
on the allowed forms of ED [40].
It is common to use equations such as (17) to define a special kind of dynam-
ics, called Markovian, that unfolds in a time defined by some external clocks.
In such a Markovian dynamics the specification of the state at one instant is
sufficient to determine its evolution into the future.3 It is important to recog-
3The application of entropic dynamics to continuous motion is, of course, heavily motivated
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nize that in ED we are not making a Markovian assumption. Although eq.(17)
is formally identical to the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation it is used for a very
different purpose. We do not use (17) to define a (Markovian) dynamics in a
pre-existing background time because in ED there are no external clocks. The
system is its own clock and (17) is used both to define the dynamics and to
construct time itself.
3.2 The arrow of entropic time
The notion of time constructed according to eq.(17) is intrinsically directional.
There is an absolute sense in which ρ(x, t) is prior and ρ(x′, t′) is posterior. If
we wanted to construct a time-reversed evolution we would write
ρ(x, t) =
∫
dx′ P (x|x′)ρ(x′, t′) , (18)
where according to the rules of probability theory P (x|x′) is related to P (x′|x)
in eq.(13) by Bayes’ theorem,
P (x|x′) =
ρ(x, t)
ρ(x′, t′)
P (x′|x) . (19)
This is not, however, a mere exchange of primed and unprimed quantities. The
distribution P (x′|x), eq.(13), is a Gaussian derived from the maximum entropy
method. In contrast, the time-reversed P (x|x′) is given by Bayes’ theorem,
eq.(19), and is not in general Gaussian. The asymmetry between the inferential
past and the inferential future is traced to the asymmetry between priors and
posteriors.
The puzzle of the arrow of time (see e.g. [42][43]) has been how to explain
the asymmetric arrow from underlying symmetric laws. The solution offered by
ED is that there are no underlying laws whether symmetric or not. The time
asymmetry is the inevitable consequence of entropic inference. From the point
of view of ED the challenge is not to explain the arrow of time but the reverse:
how to explain the emergence of symmetric laws within an entropic framework
that is intrinsically asymmetric. As we shall see below some laws of physics
derived from ED, such as the Schro¨dinger equation, are indeed time-reversible
even though entropic time itself only flows forward.
3.3 Duration: a convenient time scale
To complete the construction of entropic time we need to specify the interval
∆t between successive instants. The basic criterion is convenience: duration is
defined so that motion looks simple. We saw in eqs.(14) and (15) that for short
by the application to physics; for all we know space and time form a continuum. The derivation
of discrete Markov models as a form of entropic dynamics is a subject for future research. But
even in the case of an essentially discrete dynamics (such as e.g. the daily updates of the
stock market) the idealization of continuous evolution is still useful as an approximation over
somewhat longer time scales.
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steps (large αn) the motion is largely dominated by fluctuations. Therefore
specifying ∆t amounts to specifying the multipliers αn in terms of ∆t.
The description of motion is simplest when it reflects the symmetry of trans-
lations in space and time. In a flat spacetime this leads us to an entropic time
that resembles Newtonian time in that it flows “equably everywhere and every-
when.” Thus, we choose αn to be independent of x and t, and we choose ∆t so
that αn ∝ 1/∆t. Furthermore, it is convenient to express the proportionality
constants in terms of some particle-specific constants mn and an overall con-
stant η that fixes the units of the mns relative to the units of time. The result
is
αn =
mn
η
1
∆t
. (20)
The constants mn will eventually be identified with the particle masses and the
constant η will be regraduated into ~.
4 The information metric of configuration space
Before we proceed to study the dynamics defined eq.(13) with its corresponding
notion of entropic time it is useful to consider the geometry of the N -particle
configuration space, XN . We have assumed that the geometry of the single
particle spaces X is described by the Euclidean metric δab. We can expect
that the N -particle configuration space, XN = X × . . . ×X, will also be flat,
but a question remains about the relative scales associated to each X factor.
Information geometry provides the answer.
To each point x ∈ XN there corresponds a probability distribution P (x
′|x).
This means that XN is a statistical manifold the geometry of which is uniquely
determined (up to an overall scale factor) by the information metric,
γAB = C
∫
dx′ P (x′|x)
∂ logP (x′|x)
∂xA
∂ logP (x′|x)
∂xB
. (21)
Here the upper case indices label both the particle and its coordinate, xA = xan,
and C is an arbitrary positive constant (see e.g., [21][44]). Substituting eqs.(13)
and (20) into (21) in the limit of short steps (αn →∞) yields
γAB =
Cmn
η∆t
δnn′ δab =
Cmn
η∆t
δAB . (22)
Note the divergence as ∆t→ 0. Indeed, as ∆t→ 0 the distributions P (x′|x) and
P (x′|x+∆x) become more sharply peaked and they become increasingly easier
to distinguish. This leads to an increasing information distance, γAB →∞. To
define a distance that remains useful for arbitrarily small ∆t we choose C ∝ ∆t.
In fact, since γAB will always appear in the combination γAB∆t/C, it is best
to define the “mass” tensor,
mAB =
η∆t
C
γAB = mnδAB . (23)
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and its inverse,
mAB =
C
η∆t
γAB =
1
mn
δAB . (24)
Thus, up to overall constants the metric of configuration space is the mass
tensor. This result may be surprising. Ever since the work of Heinrich Hertz
in 1894 [45] it has been standard practice to describe the motion of systems
with many particles as the motion of a single point in an abstract space —
the configuration space. Choosing the geometry of this configuration space had
so far been regarded as a matter of convenience and was suggested through
an examination of the kinetic energy of the system. In contrast, in ED there
is no choice. Up to a global scale the metric follows uniquely determined by
information geometry.
To recap our results so far: with the multipliers αn chosen according to (20),
the dynamics given by P (x′|x) in (13) is a standard Wiener process. A generic
displacement, eq.(14), is
∆xA = bA∆t+∆wA , (25)
where bA(x) is the drift velocity,
〈∆xA〉 = bA∆t with bA = ηmAB∂BS , (26)
and the uncertainty ∆wA is given by
〈∆wA〉 = 0 and 〈∆wA∆wB〉 = ηmAB∆t . (27)
I finish this section with two remarks. The first is on the nature of clocks :
In Newtonian mechanics time is defined to simplify the motion of free particles.
The prototype of a clock is a free particle: it moves equal distances in equal
times. In ED time is also defined to simplify the dynamics of free particles. The
prototype of a clock is a free particle too: as we see in (27) free particles (because
for sufficiently short times all particles are free) undergo equal fluctuations in
equal times.
The second remark is on the nature of mass. As we shall soon see the con-
stants mn will be identified with the particles’ masses. Then, eq.(27) provides
an interpretation of what ‘mass’ is: mass is an inverse measure of fluctuations.
It is not unusual to treat the concept of mass as an unexplained primitive con-
cept that measures the amount of stuff (or perhaps the amount of energy) and
then state that quantum fluctuations are inversely proportional to mass. In
an inference scheme such as ED the presence of fluctuations do not require an
explanation. They reflect uncertainty, the natural consequence of incomplete
information. This opens the door to an entropic explanation of mass: mass is
just a measure of uncertainty about the expected motion.
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5 Diffusive dynamics
The dynamics of ρ(x, t), given by the integral equation (17), is more conveniently
re-written in a differential form known as the Fokker-Planck (FP) equation [46],
∂tρ = −∂A
(
bAρ
)
+
1
2
ηmAB∂A∂Bρ . (28)
(For the algebraic details see e.g., [21].) The FP equation can also be written
as a continuity equation,
∂tρ = −∂A
(
ρvA
)
. (29)
The product ρvA in (29) represents the probability current, and vA is interpreted
as the velocity of the probability flow — it is called the current velocity. From
(28) the current velocity in (29) is the sum of two separate contributions,
vA = bA + uA . (30)
The first term is the drift velocity bA ∝ ∂AS in (26) and describes the tendency
of the distribution ρ(x) to evolve so as to increase the entropy of the y variables.
One could adopt a language that resembles a causal mechanism: it is as if the
system were pushed by an entropic force. But, of course, such a mechanistic
language should not be taken literally. Strictly speaking, entropic forces cannot
be causal agents because they are purely epistemic. They might influence our
beliefs and expectations but they are not physically capable of pushing the
system — the “real causes,” if any, lie elsewhere. Or perhaps, there are no
real causes. In classical mechanics, for example, there is nothing out there that
causes a free particle to persist in its uniform motion in a straight line. Similarly,
in ED we are not required to identify what makes changes happen the way they
do.
The second term in (30) is the osmotic velocity,
uA = −ηmAB∂B log ρ
1/2 . (31)
It represents diffusion, the tendency for probability to flow down the density
gradient. Indeed, one might note that the osmotic or diffusive component of the
current, ρuA, obeys a version of Fick’s law in configuration space,
ρuA = −
1
2
ηmAB∂Bρ = −D
AB∂Bρ (32)
where DAB = ηmAB/2 is the diffusion tensor [46]. Here too one might be
tempted to adopt a causal mechanistic language and say that the diffusion is
driven by the fluctuations expressed in eq.(27). It is as if the system were
bombarded by some underlying random field. But eq.(27) need not represent
actual fluctuations; it represents our uncertainty about where the particle will
be found after ∆t. The mere fact that we happen to be uncertain about the
position of the particles does not imply that something must be shaking them.4
4E. T. Jaynes warned us that “the fact that our information is able to determine [a quantity]
F to 5 percent accuracy, is not enough to make it fluctuate by 5 percent!” This mistake he
called the Mind Projection Fallacy [47].
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Next we note that since both bA and uA are gradients, their sum — the
current velocity — is a gradient too,
vA = mAB∂BΦ where Φ = η(S − log ρ
1/2) . (33)
The FP equation,
∂tρ = −∂A
(
ρmAB∂BΦ
)
, (34)
can be conveniently rewritten in yet another equivalent but very suggestive form
involving functional derivatives. For some suitably chosen functional H˜ [ρ,Φ] we
have
∂tρ(x) =
δH˜
δΦ(x)
. (35)
It is easy to check that the appropriate functional H˜ is
H˜ [ρ,Φ] =
∫
dx
1
2
ρmAB∂AΦ∂BΦ + F [ρ] , (36)
where the integration constant F [ρ] is some unspecified functional of ρ.
We have just exhibited our first example of a mechanics without mechanism:
a standard diffusion derived from principles of entropic inference. Next we turn
our attention to the derivation of quantum mechanics.
6 Hamiltonian dynamics
The previous discussion has led us to a standard diffusion. It involves a single
dynamical field, the probability density ρ(x), that evolves in response to a fixed
non-dynamical “potential” given by the entropy of the y variables, S(x). In
contrast, a quantum dynamics consists in the coupled evolution of two dynamical
fields: the density ρ(x) and the phase of the wave function. This second field
can be naturally introduced into ED by allowing the entropy S(x) to become
dynamical: the entropy S guides the evolution of ρ, and in return, the evolving
ρ reacts back and induces a change in S. This amounts to an entropic dynamics
in which each short step is constrained by a slightly different drift potential; the
constraint (9) is continuously updated at each instant in time.
Clearly, different updating rules lead to different forms of ED. The rule that
turns out be particularly useful in physics is inspired by an idea of Nelson’s [48].
We require that S be updated in such a way that a certain functional, later to be
called “energy,” remains constant. Such a rule may appear to be natural — how
could it be otherwise? Could we possibly imagine physics without a conserved
energy? But this naturalness is deceptive because ED is not at all like a classical
mechanics. Indeed, the classical interpretation of a Langevin equation such as
(25) is that of a Brownian motion in the limit of infinite friction. This means that
in order to provide a classical explanation of quantum behavior we would need
to assume that the particles were subjected to infinite friction while undergoing
zero dissipation. Such a strange dynamics could hardly be called ‘classical’; the
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relevant information that is captured by our choice of constraints cannot be
modelled by invoking some underlying classical mechanism — this is mechanics
without a mechanism. Furthermore, while it is true that an updating rule
based on the notion of a conserved total energy happens to capture the relevant
constraints for a wide variety of physics problems, its applicability is limited
even within physics. For example, in the curved spacetimes that are used to
model gravity it is not possible to even define a global energy, much less require
its global conservation. (For the updating rules that apply to curved spaces see
[40].)
The ensemble Hamiltonian – In the standard approach to mechanics one
starts with an action and from its invariance under time translations one derives
the conservation of energy. Our derivation proceeds in the opposite direction:
we first identify energy conservation as the relevant piece of information and
from it we derive Hamilton’s equations and their associated action principle.
It turns out that the empirically successful energy functionals are of the form
(36). We impose that, irrespective of the initial conditions, the entropy S or,
equivalently, the potential Φ in (33), will be updated in such a way that the
functional H˜ [ρ,Φ] in (36) is always conserved,
H˜[ρ+ δρ,Φ+ δΦ] = H˜ [ρ,Φ] , (37)
or,
dH˜
dt
=
∫
dx
[
δH˜
δΦ
∂tΦ+
δH˜
δρ
∂tρ
]
= 0 . (38)
Using eq.(35) we get
dH˜
dt
=
∫
dx
[
∂tΦ+
δH˜
δρ
]
∂tρ = 0 . (39)
We want dH˜/dt = 0 to hold for arbitrary choices of the initial values of ρ and
Φ. Using eq.(34) this translates into requiring dH˜/dt = 0 for arbitrary choices
of ∂tρ. Therefore, Φ must be updated according to
∂tΦ = −
δH˜
δρ
. (40)
Equations (35) and (40) are recognized as a conjugate pair of Hamilton’s equa-
tions and the conserved functional H˜ [ρ,Φ] in (36) is then called the ensemble
Hamiltonian.
Thus, the form of the ensemble Hamiltonian H˜ is chosen so that the first
Hamilton equation (35) is the FP eq.(29), and then the second Hamilton equa-
tion (40) becomes a generalized Hamilton-Jacobi equation,
∂tΦ = −
δH˜
δρ
= −
1
2
mAB∂AΦ∂BΦ−
δF
δρ
. (41)
This is our second example of a mechanics without mechanism: a non-dissipative
ED leads to Hamiltonian dynamics.
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The action – We have just seen that the field ρ(x) is a generalized coordinate
and Φ(x) is its canonical momentum. Now that we have Hamilton’s equations,
(35) and (40), it is straightforward to invert the usual procedure and construct
an action principle from which they can be derived. Just define the differential
δA =
∫
dt
∫
dx
[(
∂tρ−
δH˜
δΦ
)
δΦ−
(
∂tΦ+
δH˜
δρ
)
δρ
]
(42)
and then integrate to get an “action”,
A[ρ,Φ] =
∫
dt
(∫
dxΦρ˙− H˜ [ρ,Φ]
)
. (43)
Thus, by construction, imposing δA = 0 leads to (35) and (40). Thus, in the ED
approach, actions are not particularly fundamental; they are just clever ways to
summarize the dynamics in a very condensed form.
7 Information geometry and the Quantum Po-
tential
Different choices of the functional F [ρ] in (36) lead to different dynamics. Ear-
lier we used information geometry, eq.(21), to define the metric mAB of config-
uration space. Here we use information geometry once again to motivate the
particular choice of the functional F [ρ] that leads to quantum theory.
The special role played by the particle positions leads us to consider the
family of distributions ρ(x|θ) that are generated from a distribution ρ(x) by
translations in configuration space by a vector θA, ρ(x|θ) = ρ(x−θ). The extent
to which ρ(x|θ) can be distinguished from the slightly displaced ρ(x|θ + dθ) or,
equivalently, the information distance between θA and θA + dθA, is given by
dℓ2 = gABdθ
AdθB (44)
where
gAB(θ) =
∫
dx
1
ρ(x − θ)
∂ρ(x− θ)
∂θA
∂ρ(x− θ)
∂θB
. (45)
Changing variables x− θ → x yields
gAB(θ) =
∫
dx
1
ρ(x)
∂ρ(x)
∂xA
∂ρ(x)
∂xB
= IAB[ρ] . (46)
Note that these are translations in configuration space. They are not trans-
lations in which the system is displaced as a whole in 3-d space by the same
constant amount, (~x1, ~x2, . . . ~xN ) → (~x1 + ~ε, ~x2 + ~ε, . . . ~xN + ~ε). The metric
(46) measures the extent to which a distribution ρ(x) can be distinguished from
another distribution ρ′(x) in which just one particle has been slightly shifted
while all others remain untouched, e.g., (~x1, ~x2, . . . ~xN )→ (~x1 + ~ε, ~x2, . . . ~xN ).
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The simplest choice of functional F [ρ] is linear in ρ, F [ρ] =
∫
dx ρ(x)V (x),
and the function V (x) will play the role of the familiar scalar potential. In an
entropic dynamics one might also expect contributions that are of a purely in-
formational nature. Information geometry provides us with two tensors: one is
the metric of configuration space γAB ∝ mAB, and the other is IAB [ρ]. The sim-
plest nontrivial scalar that can be constructed from them is the trace mABIAB .
This suggests
F [ρ] = ξmABIAB [ρ] +
∫
dx ρ(x)V (x) , (47)
where ξ > 0 is a constant that controls the relative strength of the two contri-
butions. The case ξ < 0 leads to instabilities and is therefore excluded. (From
eq.(46) we see that mABIAB is a contribution to the energy such that those
states that are more smoothly spread out tend to have lower energy.) The case
ξ = 0 leads to a qualitatively different theory — a hybrid dynamics that is both
indeterministic and yet classical [35]. The term mABIAB is usually called the
“quantum” potential or the “osmotic” potential.5 It is the crucial term that ac-
counts for all quintessentially ‘quantum’ effects — superposition, entanglement,
wave packet expansion, tunnelling, and so on.
With the choice (47) for F [ρ] the generalized Hamilton-Jacobi equation (41)
becomes
− ∂tΦ =
1
2
mAB∂AΦ∂BΦ+ V − 4ξm
AB ∂A∂Bρ
1/2
ρ1/2
. (48)
8 The Schro¨dinger equation
Once we have the coupled equations (34) and (48) we are done — it may not yet
be obvious yet but this is quantum mechanics. Purely for the sake of convenience
it is useful to combine ρ and Φ into a single complex function
Ψk = ρ
1/2 exp(iΦ/k) , (49)
where k is an arbitrary positive constant which amounts to rescaling the constant
η in eq.(33). Then the two equations (34) and (48) can be written into a single
complex equation,
ik∂tΨk = −
k2
2
mAB∂A∂BΨk + VΨk +
(
k2
2
− 4ξ
)
mAB
∂A∂B |Ψk|
|Ψk|
Ψk , (50)
which is quite simple and elegant except for the last non-linear term. It is at
this point that we can take advantage of our freedom in the choice of k. Since
the dynamics is fully specified through ρ and Φ the different choices of k in Ψk
all lead to different versions of the same theory. Among all these equivalent
descriptions it is clearly to our advantage to pick the k that is most convenient
5To my knowledge the relation between the quantum potential and the Fisher information
was first pointed out in [49].
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— a process sometimes known as ‘regraduation’.6 The optimal choice, kopt =
(8ξ)1/2, is such that the non-linear term drops out and is identified with Planck’s
constant,
~ = (8ξ)1/2 . (51)
Then eq.(50) becomes the Schro¨dinger equation,
i~∂tΨ = −
~
2
2
mAB∂A∂BΨ+ VΨ =
∑
n
−~2
2mn
∇2nΨ+ VΨ , (52)
where the wave function is
Ψ = ρeiΦ/~ . (53)
The constant ξ = ~2/8 in eq.(47) turned out to play a crucial role: it defines
the numerical value of what we call Planck’s constant and sets the scale that
separates quantum from classical regimes.
The conclusion is that for any positive value of the constant ξ it is always
possible to combine ρ and Φ to a physically equivalent but more convenient
description where the Schro¨dinger equation is linear. From the ED perspective
the linear superposition principle together with its attendant complex linear
Hilbert spaces are definitely important. But they are important because they
are convenient calculational tools and not because they are fundamental.
9 Some final comments
A theory such as ED can lead to many questions. Here are a few.
Is ED equivalent to quantum mechanics?
Are the Fokker-Planck eq.(34) and the generalized Hamilton-Jacobi eq.(48) fully
equivalent to the Schro¨dinger equation? This question, first raised by Wallstrom
[50] in the context of Nelson’s stochastic mechanics [7], concerns the single- or
multi-valuedness of phases and wave functions. Briefly Wallstrom’s objection
is that Nelson’s stochastic mechanics led to phases Φ and wave functions Ψ
that are either both multi-valued or both single-valued. Both alternatives are
unsatisfactory: quantum mechanics forbids multi-valued wave functions, while
single-valued phases can exclude physically relevant states (e.g., states with non-
zero angular momentum). We will not discuss this issue except to note that the
objection does not apply once particle spin is incorporated into ED [51][52]. A
similar argument was developed by Takabayasi in the very different context of
his hydrodynamical approach to quantum theory [53].
6Other notable examples of regraduation include the Kelvin choice of absolute temperature
and the Cox derivation of the sum and product rule for probabilities [21].
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Is ED a hidden-variable model?
Let us return to these mysterious auxiliary y variables. Should we think of them
as hidden variables? There is a trivial sense in which the y variables are “hid-
den”: they are not directly observable.7 But being unobserved is not sufficient
to qualify as a hidden variable. The original motivation behind attempts to
construct hidden variable models was to explain or at least ameliorate certain
aspects of quantum mechanics that clash with our classical preconceptions. But
the y variables address none of these problems. Let us mention a few of them:
(1) Indeterminism: Is ultimate reality random? Do the gods play dice?
In the standard view quantum theory is considered an extension of classical
mechanics — indeed, the subject is called quantum mechanics — and therefore
deviations from causality demand an explanation. In the entropic view, on
the other hand, quantum theory is not mechanics; it is inference — entropic
inference is a framework designed to handle insufficient information. From the
entropic perspective indeterminism requires no explanation. Uncertainty and
probabilities are the norm; it is the certainty and determinism of the classical
limit that demand an explanation [37].
(2) Non-classical mechanics : A common motivation for hidden variables
is that a sub-quantum world will eventually be discovered where nature obeys
essentially classical laws. But in ED there is no underlying classical dynamics
— both quantum and its classical limit are derived. The peculiar non-classical
effects associated with the wave-particle duality arise not so much from the y
variables themselves but rather from the specific non-dissipative diffusion which
leads to a Schro¨dinger equation. The important breakthrough here was Nel-
son’s realization that diffusion phenomena could be much richer than previously
expected — non-dissipative diffusions can account for wave and interference ef-
fects.
(3) Non-classical probabilities : It is often argued that classical probability
fails to describe the double slit experiment; this is not true [21]. It is the whole
entropic framework — and not the y variables — that is incompatible with the
notion of quantum probabilities. From the entropic perspective it makes just as
little sense to distinguish quantum from classical probabilities as it is would be
to talk about economic or medical probabilities.
(4) Non-locality: Realistic interpretations of the wave function often lead
to such paradoxes as the wave function collapse and the non-local Einstein-
Podolski-Rosen (EPR) correlations [4][5]. Since in the ED approach the particles
have definite positions and we have introduced auxiliary y variables that might
resemble hidden variables it is inevitable that one should ask whether this theory
violates Bell inequalities? Or, to phrase the question differently: where precisely
is non-locality introduced? The answer is that the theory has been formulated
directly in 3N -dimensional configuration space and the Hamiltonian has been
chosen to include the highly non-local quantum potential (47). So, yes, the ED
7The y variables are not observable at the current stage of development of the theory. It
may very well happen that once we learn where to look we will find that they have been
staring us in the face all along.
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model developed here properly describes the highly non-local effects that lead
to EPR correlations and to violations of Bell inequalities.
On interpretation
We have derived quantum theory as an example of entropic inference. The prob-
lem of interpretation of quantum mechanics is solved because instead of starting
with the mathematical formalism and then seeking an interpretation that can
be consistently attached to it, one starts with a unique interpretation and then
one builds the formalism. This allows a clear separation between the ontic and
the epistemic elements. In ED there is no risk of confusing which is which.
“Reality” is represented through the positions of the particles, and our “limited
information about reality” is represented by probabilities as they are updated to
reflect the physically relevant constraints. In ED all other quantities, including
the wave function, are purely epistemic tools. Even energy and momentum and
all other so-called “observables” are epistemic; they are not properties of the
particles but of the wave functions. [32][33]
To reiterate a point we made above: since “quantum” probabilities were
never mentioned one might think that entropic dynamics is a classical theory.
But this is misleading: in ED probabilities are neither classical nor quantum;
they are tools for inference. All those non-classical phenomena, such as the
non-local effects that arise in double-slit interference experiments, or the entan-
glement that leads to non-local Einstein-Podolski-Rosen correlations, are the
natural result of the linearity that follows from including the quantum potential
term in the ensemble Hamiltonian.
In ED neither action principles nor Hilbert spaces are fundamental. They
are convenient tools designed to summarize the dynamical laws derived from
the deeper principles of entropic inference. The requirement that an energy be
conserved is an important piece of information (that is, a constraint) which will
be fully justified once the extension of entropic dynamics to gravity is developed.
The derivation of laws of physics as examples of inference has led us to
discuss the concept of time. The notion of entropic time was introduced to
keep track of the accumulation of changes. It includes assumptions about the
concept of instant, of simultaneity, of ordering, and of duration. A question
that is bound to be raised is whether and how entropic time is related to the
actual, real, “physical” time. In a similar vein, to quantify the uncertainties in
the motion — the fluctuations — to each particle we associated one constant
mn. We are naturally led to ask: How are these constants related to the masses
of the particles?
The answers are provided by the dynamics itself: by deriving the Schro¨dinger
equation from which we can obtain its classical limit (Newton’s equation, F =
ma [37]) we have shown that the t that appears in the laws of physics is entropic
time and the constants mn are masses. The argument is very simple: it is the
Schro¨dinger equation and its classical limit that are used to design and calibrate
our clocks and our mass-measuring devices. We conclude that by their very de-
sign, the time measured by clocks is entropic time, and what mass measurements
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yield are the constants mn. No notion of time that is in any way more “real”
or more “physical” is needed. Most interestingly, even though the dynamics is
time-reversal invariant, entropic time is not. The model automatically includes
an arrow of time.
Finally, here we have focused on the derivation of examples of dynamics that
are relevant to physics, but the fact that ED is based on inference methods that
are of universal applicability and, in particular, the fact that in the entropic
dynamics framework one deliberately abstains from framing hypothesis about
underlying mechanisms, suggests that it may be possible to adapt these methods
to fields other than physics [54].
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